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NAVIGATING THE MAZE* 
Making Sense of Equitable Compensation and  
Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
This article examines the main monetary remedies for 
breach of fiduciary duty under Singapore law: equitable 
compensation and account of profits. It focuses on the role as 
well as the operation of causation in these two monetary 
remedies for breach of fiduciary duty. It suggests that 
studying the account of profits and equitable compensation 
side-by-side illuminates the proper questions that should be 
asked. By considering the fundamental tenets of the fiduciary 
doctrine as well as recent case law developments, we argue 
that relevant considerations for crafting appropriate remedial 
principles include scope of duty, deterrence, proportional 
consequences and good faith. Part of our discussion also 
examines the structural differences in the analysis of the 
two remedies under current law, and attempts to rationalise 
the differences. 
YIP Man 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL (Oxford); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); DS Lee Foundation Fellow; 
Assistant Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
GOH Yihan 
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard); 
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor, School of Law, Singapore Management University. 
I. Introduction 
1 This article examines the main monetary remedies for breach of 
fiduciary duty under Singapore law: equitable compensation and 
account of profits. Both areas of law are in need of clarification, though 
for different reasons. The law on the account of profits appears stable 
and uncontroversial. There has not been an opportunity for the courts 
to consider more fully the proper limitations on the scope of account. 
However, the authorities that are on point suggest that the duty to 
account for profits follows almost as a matter of course from breach. In 
                                                          
* The authors are very grateful to Professor Elise Bant for her helpful comments. All 
errors and views are the authors’ own. 
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particular, causation between profits and breach is seemingly irrelevant 
for the errant fiduciary’s liability. This article, however, cautions against 
an overly simplistic analysis. The law on equitable compensation for 
breach of fiduciary duty is, by contrast, a muddied terrain as a result of 
recent developments in Singapore and elsewhere. Yet, it may be that 
there is more orderliness to the apparent legal mess, as this article seeks 
to show. 
2 Judicial clarification from the Singapore Court of Appeal is 
required but may take some time in arriving. This article seeks to 
contribute towards clarity of the law by proposing a way of navigating 
the legal maze. This article focuses on the role as well as operation of 
the causation concept in monetary remedies for breach of fiduciary 
duty. It suggests that a study of the account of profits and equitable 
compensation side-by-side, though unconventional, illuminates the 
proper questions that should be asked. By considering the fundamental 
tenets of the fiduciary doctrine as well as case law developments, we 
argue that relevant considerations for crafting appropriate remedial 
principles include scope of duty, deterrence, proportional consequences 
and good faith. How these considerations are to be prioritised and 
whether all of them should be taken on board may vary depending 
on jurisdictional prerogatives. In this article, we also highlight the 
structural differences in the analysis of the two remedies under current 
law and attempt to rationalise the differences. 
3 By way of background, we consider in Part II1 of this article the 
fundamental tenets of the fiduciary doctrine under Singapore law. This 
part of the discussion sets out the common basis upon which we 
examine and analyse the monetary remedies. We then turn to equitable 
compensation in Part III.2 The first segment focuses on the local 
developments. The second segment highlights the possible directions 
that Singapore law may take in the future. In Part IV,3 we consider the 
law on account of profits and its relationship with equitable allowance. 
The cases suggest that the duty to account for profits is strict, although a 
bona fide fiduciary may, in very exceptional circumstances, be entitled 
to an equitable allowance. We argue that the primary duty to account 
must be considered together with the jurisdiction to award allowance so 
as to have a clear picture of the remedial principles for account of 
profits. In particular, our analysis shows that the same factors 
underpinning equitable compensation are relevant for account of 
profits, though expressed differently. Given the similar underlying 
                                                          
1 See paras 4–20 below. 
2 See paras 21–57 below. 
3 See paras 58–86 below. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
 
886 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2016) 28 SAcLJ 
 
objectives and themes, we suggest issues that merit closer scrutiny for 
account of profits. 
II. The fiduciary doctrine 
4 This article argues that the fundamental tenets of the fiduciary 
doctrine are relevant to the crafting of appropriate remedial principles. 
The doctrine must be internally consistent, from the imposition of 
duty to the imposition of liability for breach. In this part, we highlight 
four core tenets of the doctrine under Singapore law. 
A. A continuum of fiduciary relationships 
5 Historically, courts identified fiduciary relationships based on 
status: some relationships are regarded as fiduciary per se.4 Over time, 
fiduciary obligations have been imposed on parties who fall outside of 
the established categories based on the circumstances of each case5 and 
even in commercial relationships.6 Millett LJ’s famous pronouncement 
in Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew7 (“Mothew”) provides 
guidance on when a relationship outside the status-based categories may 
be fiduciary in nature:8 
A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on behalf of 
another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a 
relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation of 
the fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. 
6 In particular, courts, when dealing with cases falling outside of 
the established categories, look for elements of vulnerability and 
dependence within the relationship.9 As such, whilst the trustee is the 
paradigmatic fiduciary,10 it is clear that the kinds of relationships which 
                                                          
4 For example, trustee and beneficiary, director and company, solicitor and client, as 
well as agent and principal. 
5 For example, employees: see Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 
1 SLR 163. See also James Edelman, “When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?” (2010) 
126 LQR 302. 
6 See, for example, Singapore River Cruises & Leisure Pte Ltd v Phun Teow Kie [2000] 
1 SLR(R) 22. Cf John D Davies, “Keeping Fiduciary Liability Within Acceptable 
Limits” [1998] Sing JLS 1. 
7 [1998] Ch 1. 
8 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18. 
9 Ng Eng Ghee v Mamata Kapildev Dave [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109 at [110]; Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets Australia Pty 
Ltd (No 4) (2007) 160 FCR 35 at [286], per Jacobson J. 
10 There is some debate as to whether the fiduciary doctrine was developed by 
analogy with the trust principles or if it preceded and in fact furthered the 
development of the trust rules. See Peter Birks, “The Content of Fiduciary 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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attract the application of the fiduciary obligations are diverse, and the 
categories are not closed.11 Fiduciary relationships therefore fall on a 
continuum, with some closer to the traditional trust paradigm and 
others more removed. After all, not all fiduciaries owe custodial duties 
as a traditional trustee does and yet these fiduciaries can unilaterally 
exercise a power or discretion to affect the principal’s interests,12 thereby 
justifying the imposition of fiduciary duties. Moreover, it may be that 
fiduciary relationships arising in the commercial context are subject to 
different considerations from those arising in the non-commercial 
context. 
7 Hence, one must not assume that every fiduciary owes the 
same duties as a trustee, or that trust principles, without appropriate 
modification, are exported in entirety for application in other fiduciary 
contexts. That being the case, there are fundamental obligations that set 
the fiduciary apart from other actors and it is to this aspect of the 
fiduciary doctrine we now turn. 
B. Fiduciary obligations 
8 In Mothew, Millett LJ said that the “distinguishing obligation of 
a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty”.13 It is also well established that at 
the core of the fiduciary obligation of loyalty are two fundamental rules: 
the no-conflict and no-profit rules.14 The precise boundary as well as the 
exact function of the fiduciary doctrine remain matters of debate.15 But 
these matters need not vex us in the present discussion. There are 
two important points to note for the analysis to follow. First, it is clear 
                                                                                                                               
Obligations” (2000) 34 Israel Law Review 3 and Swindle v Harrison [1997] 4 All 
ER 705 at 734. Cf Joshua Getzler, “Rumford Market and the Genesis of Fiduciary 
Obligations” in Mapping the Law: Essays in Memory of Peter Birks (Andrew 
Burrows & Alan Rodger eds) (Oxford University Press, 2006) ch 31 at p 577. 
11 English v Dedham Vale Properties Ltd [1978] 1 WLR 93 at 110. 
12 See Susilawati v American Express Bank Ltd [2009] 2 SLR(R) 737 at [41]. 
13 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18. 
14 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18. Millett LJ included 
within his non-exhaustive list of peculiarly fiduciary obligations the duty to act  
in good faith. Cf Matthew Conaglen, Fiduciary Loyalty: Protecting the Due 
Performance of Non-fiduciary Duties (Hart Publishing, 2011) at pp 40–44. See also 
Singapore Swimming Club v Koh Sin Chong Freddie [2016] 3 SLR 845 at [136]. 
15 Conaglen argues that the function of the fiduciary doctrine (being exhausted by the 
no-conflict and no-profit rules) is a subsidiary and prophylactic form of protection 
of non-fiduciary duties: to enhance the chance that the non-fiduciary duties are 
properly performed. See Matthew Conaglen, “The Nature and Function of 
Fiduciary Loyalty” (2005) 121 LQR 452. Cf Rebecca Lee, “In Search of the Nature 
and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty: Some Observations on Conaglen’s Analysis” 
(2007) 27 OxJLS 327. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
 
888 Singapore Academy of Law Journal (2016) 28 SAcLJ 
 
that the fiduciary obligations exist to prevent abuse of position by the 
fiduciary.16 
9 Secondly, not all duties owed by a fiduciary are fiduciary duties. 
For instance, duties of care and skill are not regarded as such.17 
A distinction therefore needs to be drawn between the breach of a 
fiduciary duty and the breach of a non-fiduciary duty by a fiduciary 
because they attract different remedial consequences.18 
10 Whilst the distinction is important, there is a close relationship 
between fiduciary and non-fiduciary duties. As mentioned above, 
whether fiduciary duties – arising from a relationship of trust and 
confidence – are to be imposed is dependent upon the scope and 
content of the non-fiduciary duties. Whilst a relationship of trust and 
confidence is presumed in status-based fiduciary relationships, the 
exercise of examining the alleged fiduciary’s non-fiduciary duties is 
crucial for determining whether fiduciary duties have arisen on an 
ad hoc basis.19 Moreover, whether there has been a breach of fiduciary 
duty is partly dependent upon the scope and content of non-fiduciary 
duties: whether there has been a conflict of duty and interests; whether 
the profits earned by the fiduciary are unauthorised; whether the profits 
were earned by the errant fiduciary in the execution of his duties as 
opposed to any other capacity20 and so on. 
C. Honesty and good faith: Centrality or culpability? 
11 Yet, it is frequently recognised by the courts that parties to a 
contract can modify or completely exclude fiduciary duties from 
arising,21 although the precise permissible limits and means of 
contracting out remain contentious.22 One particular query concerns 
                                                          
16 Bray v Ford [1896] AC 44 at 51–52. 
17 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 17. 
18 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 18; Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v 
Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 at [274]. 
19 On whether employees owe fiduciary duties, the Singapore High Court said in 
Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163 at [273] that: 
… [t]he scope and the content of the fiduciary duties that may arise from the 
employment must be accommodated within the terms of the employment 
contract and must not alter its intended operation. 
20 Sinwa SS (HK) Co Ltd v Morten Innhaug [2010] 4 SLR 1 at [31]. 
21 See Hospital Products Ltd v United States Surgical Corp (1984) 156 CLR 41 at 97, 
per Mason J; Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global 
Markets Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) (2007) 160 FCR 35. 
22 Paul Finn, “Fiduciary Reflections” (2014) 88 ALJ 127 at 142–143. Cf Andrew 
Eastwood & Luke Hastings, “A Response to Professor Finn’s ‘Fiduciary 
Reflections’” (2014) 88 ALJ 314. 
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whether parties can contract out of a fiduciary’s duties to act honestly 
and in good faith.23 
12 In the trust context, which is the paradigmatic fiduciary 
relationship, it was established in Armitage v Nurse24 that the 
“irreducible core” of trustee obligations is the trustee’s duty to “perform 
the trust honestly and in good faith for the benefit of the beneficiaries”.25 
The duties of honesty and good faith are the minimum content of a trust 
relationship: contracting out of these duties would mean that the 
relationship ceases to be one. It also follows that a trust exemption 
clause that purports to exempt liability for breach of the “irreducible 
core” of trustee obligations is void.26 It appears that the “irreducible 
core” of trustee obligations can be further reduced in a specialised 
commercial context, as suggested by Citibank NA v MBIA Assurance 
SA.27 The decision has caused controversy for being inconsistent with 
trust principles.28 But it may be explained on the exceptional facts of the 
case as arising in the context of debt securitisation.29 
13 Nevertheless, as discussed above, not all fiduciary relationships 
are closely analogous to the trust paradigm. As such, it may be that the 
trustee’s “irreducible core” of obligations is not directly applicable to all 
fiduciaries. But it remains important to consider the minimum content 
that is necessary to give substance to a fiduciary relationship. Quite 
apart from automatic exportation from the trust concept, it is strongly 
arguable that duties of honesty and good faith form the core and 
minimum content of a fiduciary relationship.30 It is hard to imagine 
                                                          
23 Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Citigroup Global Markets 
Australia Pty Ltd (No 4) (2007) 160 FCR 35 at [280], per Jacobson J. 
24 [1998] Ch 241. 
25 Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 at 253–254; and endorsed by the High Court in 
Then Khek Koon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2014] 1 SLR 245 at [107]. Singapore 
law recognises that a trust exemption clause can be effective to relieve trustee’s 
liability for breach of trust: see Rajabali Jumabhoy v Ameerali R Jumabhoy [1998] 
2 SLR(R) 576. 
26 The crux of the appeal in Armitage v Nurse [1998] Ch 241 related to the 
permissible scope of a trust exemption clause under English law. 
27 [2007] EWCA Civ 11; [2007] 1 All ER (Comm) 475. 
28 See, for example, Alexander Trukhtanov, “The Irreducible Core of Trust 
Obligations” (2007) 123 LQR 342 and Graham Virgo, The Principles of Equity & 
Trusts (Oxford University Press, 2012) at p 549. 
29 The role of a security trustee is markedly different to the role of a conventional 
trustee. The function of the security trustee is to enforce the collective enforcement 
of the noteholders’ rights for the benefit of the note issuer. See an excellent 
discussion in Phillip Rawlings, “Reinforcing Collectivity: The Liability of Trustees 
and the Power of Investors in Finance Transactions” (2009) 23 TLI 14. 
30 Peter Devonshire, “Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (2010) 32 Syd 
L Rev 389 at 394. 
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that the principle of single-minded loyalty does not require, at the 
minimum, honesty and good faith on the part of the fiduciary. 
14 Significantly, the minimum content of the fiduciary relationship 
reflects the expectations that the relationship engenders.31 It follows that 
the breach of these core duties is considered more egregious and 
therefore attracts more severe remedial consequences or more stringent 
remedial principles to effect strong deterrence. Conversely, the evidence 
of honesty and good faith in the breach of the fiduciary duty may justify 
more lenient treatment at the remedial stage. 
15 Alternatively, honesty and good faith may be taken into account 
in remedial consequences as a matter of measuring the degree of 
blameworthiness, akin to the remedial principles that operate in tort 
law. The more blameworthy the conduct, such as dishonesty, the more 
stringent the principles for effecting strong deterrence. The less 
blameworthy the conduct, such as an innocent breach, the less stringent 
those principles are, as deterrence is less relevant in such cases. 
For example, as was held by the House of Lords in Smith New Court 
Securities Ltd v Citibank NA,32 damages for the fraudulent 
misrepresentation (the tort of deceit) would include all losses that 
flowed directly from the entry into the contract in question, regardless 
of whether or not such loss was foreseeable. This is in contrast to 
negligent misrepresentation, where the remoteness rules are not as 
generous to the plaintiff. 
D. Deterrence 
16 Deterrence is an underlying theme of the fiduciary doctrine. 
Singapore courts generally adopt a very strict approach towards breach 
of fiduciary duty so as to remove any encouragement to fiduciaries to 
commit breach of duty. In Ng Eng Ghee v Mamata Kapildev Dave,33 the 
Court of Appeal, in obiter, indicated a preference to follow the stricter 
test in determining conflict of interest as enunciated by the majority in 
Boardman v Phipps,34 which requires only a mere possibility of conflict. 
This is notwithstanding that Lord Upjohn’s “real sensible possibility” of 
conflict test – albeit a dissenting judgment in the case – has found 
favour with lower English courts subsequently.35 A primary reason given 
by the Court of Appeal for such a strict approach is the need to 
                                                          
31 Peter Devonshire, “Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (2010) 32 Syd 
L Rev 389 at 394. 
32 [1996] 3 WLR 1051. 
33 [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109 at [142]–[145]. 
34 [1967] 2 AC 46. 
35 See, for example, Re Bhullar [2003] BCC 711 at [272], per Parker LJ. 
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“extinguish all possibility of temptation and to deter fiduciaries who 
may be tempted to abuse their positions”.36 
17 As for the no-profits rule, the Court of Appeal has generally 
followed the traditional English approach:37 a fiduciary may not, by the 
use of his position, earn a profit unless he has obtained the informed 
consent of the principal.38 Breach of the no-profit rule is strict.39 It does 
not depend on the bona fides of the fiduciary, whether the profit would 
or should otherwise have gone to the principal, whether the conduct 
benefited the principal, or whether the fiduciary is duty-bound to obtain 
the profit for the principal.40 
18 Further, Singapore courts have long taken the view that strong 
deterrence is needed in cases involving bribery of public officials,41 
which justifies the imposition of an institutional constructive trust 
over bribes received by fiduciaries. More recently, in Guy Neale v Nine 
Squares Pty Ltd,42 the Court of Appeal endorsed the decision by the 
UK Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital 
Partners LLC43 (“FHR”). It was held in FHR that an institutional 
constructive trust is available against bribes and secret commissions 
received by a fiduciary in breach of fiduciary duty.44 
19 It will be seen in the discussion of equitable compensation and 
account of profits below45 that Singapore courts similarly favour 
principles that enhance the deterrence of breach of fiduciary duty. It is 
not clear if fiduciaries will actually be deterred from breaching their 
                                                          
36 Ng Eng Ghee v Mamata Kapildev Dave [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109 at [143]. Other reasons 
offered by the court related to the general difficulty of determining the errant 
fiduciary’s motives and detecting actual conflicts given that the fiduciary is often 
well placed to conceal them: at [144]–[145]. 
37 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134. 
38 Lim Suat Hua v Singapore HealthPartners Pte Ltd [2012] 2 SLR 805 at [90]. 
39 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 at 145. 
40 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 at 144–145. 
41 Sumitomo Bank v Thahir Kartika Ratna [1992] 3 SLR(R) 638 at [241]–[242], 
per Lai Kew Chai J. The decision was affirmed by the Singapore Court of Appeal in 
Thahir Kartika Ratna v PT Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara 
(Pertamina) [1994] 3 SLR(R) 312. 
42 [2015] 1 SLR 1097 at [130]. Singapore law presently recognises a remedial 
constructive trust, see a general discussion in Man Yip, “Singapore’s Remedial 
Constructive Trust: Lessons from Australia” (2014) 8 J Eq 77. 
43 [2014] 3 WLR 535. 
44 It should be noted that English law does not presently recognise a remedial 
constructive trust. See FHR European Ventures LLP v Cedar Capital Partners LLC 
[2014] 3 WLR 535 at [47]. 
45 See paras 21–86 below. 
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fiduciary duties by the adoption of stricter principles.46 Indeed, Smith 
argues that the account of profits remedy, which merely forfeits the 
precise amount of the wrongful gains, is poorly designed to serve the 
deterrent function.47 Notwithstanding this view, there is likely to be 
some general deterrent effect, even if not overwhelmingly so. Moreover, 
the adoption of strict principles sends a strong message that breach of 
fiduciary duty is repugnant in the eyes of Singapore law. Until such a 
time that the law is fully open to the idea of imposing punitive awards 
for breach of equitable obligations,48 it may be that stringent principles 
are the best tools that equity has for deterring wrongdoing. But, as will 
be discussed below, the degree to which deterrence should feature in the 
remedial stage may differ depending on the circumstances of the case. 
20 We now move on to consider the monetary remedies for breach 
of fiduciary duty, starting off by examining the law on equitable 
compensation. 
III. Equitable compensation 
21 Traditionally, under Singapore law, all losses can be claimed as 
equitable compensation against the errant fiduciary so long as they 
satisfy the simple “but for” causation test.49 The common law principles 
of causation, foreseeability and remoteness were said to be inapplicable.50 
This approach has remained unchallenged until recently.51 It is also 
                                                          
46 The effect of both specific and general deterrence has been doubted by 
commentators, though usually in the context of searching for an appropriate 
justification for awarding proprietary relief for breach of fiduciary duty. See, 
for example, Katy Barnett, “Distributive Justice and Proprietary Remedies over 
Bribes” (2015) 35 Legal Stud 302 at 305–306. 
47 Lionel Smith, “Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary Obligations” 
(2013) 7 J Eq 87 at 92. 
48 Punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty is not available in New South Wales, 
Australia: see Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 10; (2003) 197 ALR 626, 
noted in James Edelman, “A ‘Fusion Fallacy’ Fallacy?” (2003) 119 LQR 375. 
Cf punitive awards for equitable wrongs are available under New Zealand law: see, 
for example, Aquaculture Corp v New Zealand Green Mussel Co Ltd [1990] 3 NZLR 299 
(breach of confidence). 
49 Ohm Pacific Sdn Bhd v Ng Hwee Cheng Doreen [1994] 2 SLR(R) 633 at [23]; 
Kumagai-Zenecon Construction Pte Ltd v Low Hua Kin [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1049; John 
While Springs (S) Pte Ltd v Goh Sai Chuah Justin [2004] 3 SLR(R) 596; First Energy 
Pte Ltd v Creanovate Pte Ltd [2007] 1 SLR(R) 1050 (the appeal did not revisit the 
principles for equitable compensation: Creanovate Pte Ltd v First Energy Pte Ltd 
[2007] 4 SLR(R) 780). 
50 First Energy Pte Ltd v Creanovate Pte Ltd [2007] 1 SLR(R) 1050 at [85], 
per Andrew Ang J. 
51 Cf Tan Sook Yee & Kelvin Low Fatt Kin, “Equity and Trust” (2004) 5 SAL Ann 
Rev 260 at 271, para 12.34. 
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interesting that this approach is consistent with the fiercely criticised52 
House of Lords’ decision in Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns53 (“Target 
Holdings”), though Target Holdings was not cited in these earlier local 
authorities.54 Instead, In re Dawson, Pattisson v Bathurst55 and Re Dawson 
(deceased)56 (“Re Dawson”) were relied upon by the High Court in the 
seminal case, Kumagai-Zenecon Construction Pte Ltd v Low Hua Kin57 
(“Kumagai-Zenecon”). 
22 However, it has been observed that Re Dawson, a case 
frequently cited for equitable compensation for breach of trust in the 
Commonwealth, has been interpreted variously.58 The particularly 
obfuscating part of Street J’s judgment is as follows:59 
The principles embodied in this approach do not appear to involve 
any inquiry into whether the loss was caused by or flowed from the 
breach. Rather the enquiry in each instance would appear to be 
whether the loss would have happened if there had been no breach. 
23 Although Street J’s quote above was not explicitly cited in 
Kumagai-Zenecon, it is clear that the principles laid down in Kumagai-
Zenecon interpreted the quote to mean “the fiduciary can escape liability 
only if he can demonstrate that the loss or suffering would have 
happened even if there [had] been no breach”.60 In assessing the 
defendant’s liability for equitable compensation, the court in Kumagai-
Zenecon determined the “proximate and effective cause” of the plaintiff ’s 
loss.61 In the later decision of John While Springs (S) Pte Ltd v Goh Sai 
Chuah Justin,62 the High Court commented that Kumagai-Zenecon 
“made it plain” that the plaintiffs must prove that their losses were 
                                                          
52 Cf Andrew Burrows, “We Do This at Common Law and That in Equity” (2002) 
22 OxJLS 1 at 10–11. 
53 [1996] AC 421. 
54 Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421 was referred to in John While 
Springs (S) Pte Ltd v Goh Sai Chuah Justin [2004] 3 SLR(R) 596 at [6] for the point 
that in respect of equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty, “the detailed 
rules of evidence between the common law and equity were different, [but] the 
fundamental principles of the burden of proof remained the same”. 
55 [1915] 1 Ch 626. 
56 [1966] 2 NSWR 211. 
57 [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1049 at [35]–[36]. 
58 Jamie Glister, “Equitable Compensation” in Fault Lines in Equity (Jamie Glister & 
Pauline Ridge eds) (Hart Publishing, 2012) ch 7 at p 144. 
59 Re Dawson (deceased) [1966] 2 NSWR 211 at 215. 
60 Kumagai-Zenecon Construction Pte Ltd v Low Hua Kin [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1049 
at [35]. The propositions were not challenged on appeal: see Low Hua Kin v 
Kumagai-Zenecon Construction Pte Ltd [2000] 2 SLR(R) 689. 
61 Kumagai-Zenecon Construction Pte Ltd v Low Hua Kin [1999] 3 SLR(R) 1049 
at [40]. 
62 [2004] 3 SLR(R) 596. 
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caused by or linked to the defendant’s breach of fiduciary duty.63 In 
Singapore, therefore, Re Dawson had been interpreted to have laid down 
the rule that loss must be shown to have been caused by the breach of 
duty.64 It is noteworthy that this was also the interpretation adopted by 
the House of Lords in Target Holdings. 
A. Recent Singapore developments 
24 More recently, Singapore’s courts have reconsidered the “but-for” 
causation approach. In Then Khek Khoon v Arjun Permanand Samtani65 
(“Then Khek Khoon (2012)”) the first local case to cite Target Holdings 
for the “but-for” causation approach,66 Quentin Loh J doubted that 
“a simplistic ‘but-for’ test fits all cases in assessing the amount of 
equitable compensation”.67 He questioned if concurrent or intervening 
causes, or reasonableness in quantum are completely irrelevant to the 
determination of equitable compensation.68 He further noted the 
non-uniform developments in other common law jurisdictions.69 
Notwithstanding these strong doubts,70 the interlocutory application 
before Loh J did not require a conclusive resolution of these difficult 
matters.71 
25 An opportunity for fuller review arose before the High Court in 
Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing72 (“Quality 
Assurance”). In that case, Zhang, a senior employee, breached his 
fiduciary duties to the company by setting up a rival company and using 
the company’s business opportunities, time and revenue-generating 
equipment to earn profits. Zhang conceded owing fiduciary duties to 
                                                          
63 John While Springs (S) Pte Ltd v Goh Sai Chuah Justin [2004] 3 SLR(R) 596 at [5]. 
64 Cf Jamie Glister, “Equitable Compensation” in Fault Lines in Equity (Jamie 
Glister & Pauline Ridge eds) (Hart Publishing, 2012) ch 7 at pp 144–147. Glister 
forcefully argues that Re Dawson (deceased) [1966] 2 NSWR 211 should be more 
restrictively interpreted as standing for the principle of restoring a trust to the 
position before the breach. In Glister’s view, it should “only ever apply to breaches 
of trust or other custodial fiduciary relations that involve the misapplication of 
trust property (and perhaps not to all of them)”. 
65 [2012] 2 SLR 451. 
66 Then Khek Khoon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2012] 2 SLR 451 at [52]. 
67 Then Khek Khoon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2012] 2 SLR 451 at [54]. See also 
Jane Stapleton, “Unnecessary Causes” (2013) 129 LQR 39. Stapleton argues that 
private law should admit a causation test that is wider than the “but-for” test and 
substantiates her thesis by primary reference to claims in torts of negligence. 
68 Then Khek Khoon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2012] 2 SLR 451 at [58]. 
69 Then Khek Khoon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2012] 2 SLR 451 at [51]–[68]. 
70 Quentin Loh J caveated that the outcomes arrived at in these earlier cases were 
correct. See Then Khek Khoon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2012] 2 SLR 451 
at [64] and [67]. 
71 Then Khek Khoon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2012] 2 SLR 451 at [68]. 
72 [2013] 3 SLR 631. 
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the company.73 Our discussion focuses on the company’s claim for 
equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty,74 in particular, the 
court’s analysis of the appropriate causation concept. 
26 Before the High Court, on appeal from the assistant registrar’s 
assessment, Vinodh Coomaraswamy JC (as his Honour then was) 
observed that equitable compensation started off as a remedy for breach 
of trust in English law and was later made available for a breach of 
fiduciary duty by any fiduciary.75 In this connection, he identified 
two key distinctions between equitable compensation and common law 
damages. 
27 First, unlike the common law which presumes the wrongdoer 
and the innocent party to be equal and independent, equity considers 
that the innocent party, who depends on the wrongdoer to act in its best 
interests, is “especially vulnerable” to the latter’s breach of duty.76 As 
such, whilst the common law protects the wrongdoer by qualifying its 
liability based on concepts of causation, foreseeability and remoteness, 
equity generally favours the innocent party over the wrongdoer. 
Common law and equity therefore have different remedial objectives: 
the former seeks to compensate for loss whilst the latter seeks to deter 
breach of fiduciary duty through stringent principles.77 By way of 
example, Coomaraswamy JC referred to the principle enunciated in 
Brickenden v London Loan & Savings Co (“the Brickenden rule”).78 
According to the Brickenden rule, the errant fiduciary would be liable 
for loss in some way connected to his breach, even if the breach merely 
set the occasion for the loss but did not cause it.79 
28 The second distinction between equitable compensation and 
common law damages is that the former is characterised as “an equitable 
debt”, which is analogous to the concept of a common law debt that 
                                                          
73 Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing [2013] 3 SLR 631 
at [26]. 
74 The company elected to pursue a claim for compensation, as opposed to an 
account of profits. 
75 Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing [2013] 3 SLR 631 
at [35]. 
76 Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing [2013] 3 SLR 631 
at [37]–[38]. 
77 Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing [2013] 3 SLR 631 
at [39]–[41]. 
78 [1934] 3 DLR 465. The Brickenden rule was first mentioned in local jurisprudence 
by Quentin Loh J in Then Khek Khoon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2012] 
2 SLR 451 at [60]–[62], in the course of describing the developments in other 
jurisdictions. See also a discussion in Tan Ruo Yu, “Causation in Equitable 
Compensation: The Brickenden Rule in Singapore” (2014) 26 SAcLJ 724. 
79 Jamie Glister, “Breach of Fiduciary Duty: Brickenden Lives On” (2011) 5 J Eq 59 
at 66. 
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enforces the performance of a primary obligation.80 But an award of 
common law damages is a secondary obligation arising from the breach. 
Where a debt is claimed – at law or in equity – common law principles 
of limitations do not apply. This observation warrants fuller analysis. 
29 It is not clear why Coomaraswamy JC considered that he was 
bound to apply the Brickenden rule in the first place when previous 
authorities had consistently applied the “but-for” causation approach. In 
any event, Coomaraswamy JC was not satisfied that the Brickenden rule 
should apply in all contexts.81 He noted that fiduciary relationships are 
of many kinds, and not all are closely analogous to the trust paradigm in 
which the principles of equitable compensation were first developed. He 
also considered that moral culpability ought to be relevant for 
determining liability for equitable compensation. 
30 Without conclusively deciding on its precise scope of operation, 
Coomaraswamy JC said that the Brickenden rule would only apply to a 
fiduciary falling within one of the well-established categories and where 
he has committed a culpable breach of a core fiduciary obligation,82 
though it was not explained what constitutes a “core fiduciary 
obligation”. On the facts, the Brickenden rule was applicable because 
Zhang was a senior employee and he had committed a “conscious, 
deliberate and flagrant” breach of “all aspects of the duty of loyalty”.83 
31 Vinodh Coomaraswamy J (as his Honour had then become) 
developed the remedial regime further in the subsequent case, Then 
Khek Koon v Arjun Permanand Samtani84 (“Then Khek Koon (2013)”). In 
that case, five subsidiary proprietors claimed for equitable compensation 
against two members of the collective sale committee for the latter’s 
breaches of duties.85 The subsidiary proprietors had incurred 
considerable legal costs in objecting (successfully) to the collective sale 
of the relevant strata title development. The Court of Appeal awarded 
the subsidiary proprietors costs on a standard rather than indemnity 
                                                          
80 Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing [2013] 3 SLR 631 
at [50]. 
81 Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing [2013] 3 SLR 631 
at [52]. 
82 Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing [2013] 3 SLR 631 
at [56]. 
83 Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing [2013] 3 SLR 631 
at [57]. 
84 [2014] 1 SLR 245. This was the continuation of the collective sale saga in respect of 
Horizon Towers. The earlier Court of Appeal decision in Ng Eng Ghee v Mamata 
Kapildev Dave [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109 had determined, amongst other matters, that a 
collective sale committee owes fiduciary duties to the subsidiary proprietors. 
85 See Ng Eng Ghee v Mamata Kapildev Dave [2009] 3 SLR(R) 109. 
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basis as sought by the subsidiary proprietors.86 The subsidiary 
proprietors then sued the same two members of the collective sale 
committee for breach of fiduciary duties, seeking to recover 
compensation equivalent to the difference between the costs awarded by 
the Court of Appeal and the actual legal costs incurred. 
32 Anchoring on Quality Assurance, Coomaraswamy J distinguished 
between three types of cases where different assessment rules would 
apply.87 First, following Mothew,88 the common law doctrines of 
foreseeability, causation and remoteness are applicable in respect of a 
fiduciary’s liability for the breach of his non-fiduciary duties of skill and 
care. Secondly, the Brickenden rule applies where a fiduciary is in one of 
the well-established categories of fiduciary relationships and has 
committed a culpable breach of his “core duties of honesty and fidelity”, 
that is, he is liable to pay equitable compensation even where “but-for” 
causation is not satisfied. Finally, the “but-for” causation test enunciated 
by Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Target Holdings applies in cases where the 
fiduciary falls in one of the well-established categories but loss is caused 
by an innocent breach of his fiduciary duties. 
33 Applied to the facts, it was held that the sale committee 
members’ liability to pay equitable compensation was subject to the 
Target Holdings “but-for” causation approach. This is because a 
collective sale committee’s fiduciary relationship with the subsidiary 
proprietors is a “novel” one.89 It was further held that the committee 
members’ breach of fiduciary duties did not cause the subsidiary 
proprietors’ loss because they would have incurred the legal costs in any 
event, as the proceedings to block the collective sale proceeded solely 
from their desire to keep their homes. The court also considered it 
contrary to the principle of finality to revisit an issue that had been 
decided by the Court of Appeal. 
34 The subsidiary proprietors appealed90 but it was dismissed by 
the Court of Appeal simply on the basis that if they were not entitled to 
the claimed amount as costs in the first place, the same cannot be 
                                                          
86 Ng Eng Ghee v Mamata Kapildev Dave [2009] 4 SLR(R) 155. 
87 Then Khek Koon v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2014] 1 SLR 245 at [108]. 
88 Bristol & West Building Society v Mothew [1998] Ch 1 at 16–17, per Millett LJ. 
89 Although Vinodh Coomaraswamy J’s categorisation did not directly address a 
fiduciary relationship that does not fall within well-established categories, his 
holding suggests that the liability of fiduciary not falling within the well-established 
categories and who did not commit a culpable breach would be subject to the 
“but-for” causation test. What is less clear is whether the Brickenden rule or the 
“but-for” causation test applies in a case where the fiduciary relationship does not 
fall within the well-established categories but the errant fiduciary committed a 
deliberate breach of his core duties. 
90 Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2015] 1 SLR 496. 
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recovered by mounting a different cause of action.91 The court did not 
comment on the correctness of Coomaraswamy J’s approach on 
equitable compensation for breach of fiduciary duty, but merely noted 
that this is “an unsettled area of law within the Commonwealth and 
was the subject of much academic debate”.92 Nonetheless, the court 
highlighted various academic commentaries,93 as well as the 
UK Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark 
Redler & Co Solicitors94 (“AIB”) as relevant jurisprudence for future 
consideration. 
35 The position under Singapore law appears open at this point. 
The traditional “but-for” test of causation seems simple and certain.95 
It does not distinguish between the different types of fiduciary 
relationships nor does it take into account the moral culpability of the 
breach. It accords with the general understanding of compensation at 
law: to make good losses caused by the breach, though unattenuated by 
common law limitations. 
36 Coomaraswamy J’s categorisation approach, on the other hand, 
seeks to pay greater heed to the distinctions between equity and 
common law. This is consistent with the general non-fusionist attitude 
of Singapore’s courts.96 Importantly, Coomaraswamy J identified that 
equitable compensation is to be analogised to a debt at law,97 which 
enforces a primary obligation. As the discussion below will show, the 
label “equitable compensation” conceals two kinds of awards: one which 
is the equitable counterpart of a common law debt, and the other which 
resembles common law damages. Such a distinction has yet to be 
considered in local jurisprudence. 
37 In working out the causation concept for equitable 
compensation, Coomaraswamy J took into account three factors: first, 
                                                          
91 Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2015] 1 SLR 496 at [11]. 
92 Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2015] 1 SLR 496 at [9]. 
93 Maryani Sadeli v Arjun Permanand Samtani [2015] 1 SLR 496 at [10]. 
94 [2014] 3 WLR 1367, noted in Lusina Ho, “Equitable Compensation on the Road to 
Damascus?” (2015) 131 LQR 213. 
95 Cf Elise Bant, “Causation and Scope of Liability in Unjust Enrichment” [2009] 
RLR 17. Bant, through a close scrutiny of unjust enrichment cases, argues that the 
“but for” test is not the most appropriate causation test where “decision causation” 
cases are concerned. 
96 Yip Man, “Equity and Trusts – Dreaming and Building a Singapore Equitable 
Jurisdiction” in The Development of Singapore Law: Twenty Years of the 
Application of English Law Act (Goh Yihan & Paul Tan eds) (Academy Publishing, 
2015) ch 12. 
97 Justice Edelman, “An English Misturning with Equitable Compensation” 
UNSW Australia Colloquium on Equitable Compensation and Disgorgement of 
Profit (7–8 August 2015), available at <http://www.fedcourt.gov.au/publications/ 
judges-speeches/justice-edelman/edelman-j-201508> (accessed 27 March 2016). 
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the type of fiduciary relationship matters. Well-established fiduciary 
relationships are subject to stringent equitable principles. Novel 
fiduciary relationships are not. Such a distinction appears to be based on 
the assumption that novel fiduciary relationships are further removed 
from the trust paradigm.98 Second, the type of duty matters. Consistent 
with Mothew, breaches of peculiarly fiduciary duties attract different 
remedial consequences from breaches of non-fiduciary duties. Finally, 
moral culpability matters. A deliberate breach, as compared to an 
innocent breach, is to be subject to more stringent principles. 
Underlying these considerations, particularly the last one, is the idea 
that the policy objective of deterrence is not to be pursued rigorously 
and to the same extent in all situations.99 
38 Overall, Coomaraswamy J’s proposed framework, as compared 
to the “but-for” causation approach, seeks to better reflect the 
fundamental tenets of the fiduciary doctrine. However, in crafting an 
appropriate causation approach, the court should also consider more 
deeply the historical development of equitable compensation and 
landmark rulings from other common law jurisdictions, in particular, 
the decision of AIB as highlighted by the Court of Appeal. 
B. Traditional accounting rules and custodial fiduciaries 
39 Any examination of equitable compensation must begin with 
breach of trust, the context in which the rules were first developed. 
Equitable compensation for breach of trust is traditionally derived from 
the application of equitable accounting rules: common account and an 
account on the basis of “wilful default”.100 These rules are developed 
upon and for the purpose of enforcing a trustee’s duty to account for his 
stewardship. They are procedural because an account is “the first step in 
a process which enables him to identify and quantify any deficit in the 
trust fund and seek the appropriate means by which it may be made 
good”.101 An account may be sought without proving a breach. But the 
rules are also substantive because the manner in which an account is 
taken affects the assessment of equitable compensation.102 
                                                          
98 One may, however, disagree with such an assumption. That a fiduciary 
relationship is well established does not necessarily mean that it is more trust-like. 
For example, an agent is a well-established fiduciary but an agent is not in every 
case a custodial fiduciary. See also discussion at para 45 below. 
99 Quality Assurance Management Asia Pte Ltd v Zhang Qing [2013] 3 SLR 631 
at [43]. 
100 See an excellent discussion in Lord Peter Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of 
Commerce” (1998) 114 LQR 214. 
101 Libertarian Investments Ltd v Hall [2014] 1 HKC 368 at [168], per Millett NPJ. 
102 Agricultural Land Management v Jackson (No 2) [2014] WASC 102 at [334]. 
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40 A common account is typically sought in cases of 
misapplication of property. This involves the falsification of the account, 
that is to say, any wrongful disbursement is disallowed. The trustee is 
liable to make good the resulting shortfall in the trust estate. The 
objective of the common account is to provide the money equivalent of 
the performance of the obligation. It is not concerned with losses; 
causation is thus irrelevant. 
41 The taking of account on the basis of wilful default involves the 
surcharging of the account. “Wilful default” in this context refers to a 
lack of care and prudence.103 Equitable compensation is awarded to 
make good losses caused by the trustee’s negligent management. It 
follows that causation is relevant for accounting on the basis of wilful 
default. 
42 Elliott developed the label “substitutive” compensation to 
describe the award that is derived from the taking of common account 
and the label “reparative” compensation to describe the award that is 
derived from the taking of account on the basis of wilful default.104 It is 
clear that substitutive compensation is analogous to a debt at law and 
reparative compensation is more akin to common law damages. 
43 However, the equitable accounting rules fell into disuse 
historically, owing to two developments. First, split trials became more 
infrequent for cases concerning the taking of account on the basis of 
wilful default.105 When issues of liability and quantum were examined in 
the same hearing, the parties’ attention was intensely focused on the 
issue of liability (whether the defendant was accountable), as opposed to 
the issue of quantification (the manner of accounting). Secondly, in 
the 20th century, the language of “equitable compensation” gained 
popularity and replaced the equitable account, which led to the 
traditional rules becoming obscured.106 
                                                          
103 The label has been misunderstood to mean deliberate wrongdoing: see Libertarian 
Investments Ltd v Hall [2014] 1 HKC 368 at [121]–[122], noted in Lusina Ho & 
Rebecca Lee, “Reparative Compensation for Deliberate Breaches of Trust” (2014) 
130 LQR 542 at 544. 
104 See Steven Elliott, “Compensation Claims against Trustees” (DPhil thesis, 
University of Oxford, 2002). 
105 Justice Edelman (extra-judicially), “An English Misturning with Equitable 
Compensation” UNSW Australia colloquium on equitable compensation and 
disgorgement of profit (7–8 August 2015), available at <http://www.fedcourt. 
gov.au/publications/judges-speeches/justice-edelman/edelman-j-201508> (accessed 
15 February 2016). 
106 Justice Edelman (extra-judicially), “An English Misturning with Equitable 
Compensation” UNSW Australia colloquium on equitable compensation and 
disgorgement of profit (7–8 August 2015), available at <http://www.fedcourt. 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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44 Indeed, in Target Holdings, a case concerning a breach of trust 
arising in the commercial setting, there was no reference to the 
traditional accounting rules. The focus was on whether the loss was 
caused by the breach.107 Whilst commentators agree with the outcome in 
Target Holdings, they disagree with the reasoning.108 They point out that 
the breach of trust in Target Holdings concerned misapplication of trust 
funds – the case should thus have been analysed as a case of substitutive 
compensation and causation ought not to have been relevant.109 
45 The primary obligation to account for one’s stewardship is not 
only relevant to breach of trust. It is said to be central to all custodial 
fiduciary relationships, of which the trust is the archetype. An award of 
substitutive compensation is thus available against a custodial fiduciary 
in breach of his custodial duties. An example would be misapplication of 
company assets by a director.110 On the traditional account, therefore, it 
is clear that the remedial principles differ depending on the type of 
fiduciary relationship and the duties that are breached: trust and 
custodial fiduciary relationships (trust-like relationships) are subject to 
the trust principles for assessing equitable compensation. 
46 Three matters, however, remain uncertain. First, where a 
reparative compensation award is sought, courts have yet to decide on 
the appropriate causation test.111 One possible approach, as Elliott 
advocates, is to develop the criteria by differentiating between 
intentional and unintentional breaches of trust, in harmony with 
tortious wrongs.112 He proposed that unintentional and judicious 
breaches are subject to the requirement of reasonable foreseeability, 
whereas losses arising from intentional disloyalty are not limited by the 
same criterion and are generally recoverable if they are a direct result of 
the breach. But others disagree with an approach that partly aligns with 
                                                                                                                               
gov.au/publications/judges-speeches/justice-edelman/edelman-j-201508> (accessed 
15 February 2016). 
107 Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] 1 AC 421 at 428. Cf Bairstow v Queens Moat 
Houses plc [2001] EWCA Civ 712 at [105], per Robert Walker LJ. 
108 See, for example, Peter Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce” (1998) 
114 LQR 214; James Edelman, “Money Awards of the Cost of Performance” (2010) 
4 J Eq 122; and Jamie Glister, “Equitable Compensation” in Fault Lines in Equity 
(Jamie Glister & Pauline Ridge eds) (Hart Publishing, 2012) at pp 148–151. 
109 Cf Youyang v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher [2003] HCA 15. 
110 Agricultural Land Management Ltd v Jackson (No 2) [2014] WASC 102 at [344]; 
Jamie Glister, “Equitable Compensation” in Fault Lines in Equity (Jamie Glister & 
Pauline Ridge eds) (Hart Publishing, 2012). 
111 See Agricultural Land Management Ltd v Jackson (No 2) [2014] WASC 102. 
112 Steven Elliott, “Remoteness Criteria in Equity” (2002) 65 MLR 588 at 597. 
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the common law approach, on account of the “unique foundations and 
goals of equity”.113 
47 Second, it is not always easy to determine the cases that should 
attract the application of the accounting rules. After all, breaches of 
fiduciary duty are articulated in terms of breach of the no-conflict rule 
or no-profit rule, as opposed to misapplication of property or negligent 
management. The potential for confusion increases when we stray 
beyond directors who are considered to be the most closely analogous to 
the trustees given their duty to manage the company’s assets. Consider 
the case of a senior employee who is found to have breached the 
no-conflict rule by causing the company to enter into a contract with 
another company that he also owed duties to, and this contract resulted 
in the first company paying a higher rate to the second company.114 Is 
the senior employee a custodial fiduciary and in breach of his custodial 
duty in such circumstances?115 Even where a director is concerned, 
courts do not always resolve the cases by reference to the accounting 
rules.116 In a case of a breach of fiduciary duty resulting in the 
misapplication of company funds, what is the wrongdoing against which 
remedial principles are targeted – the breach of the no-conflict rule or 
the misapplication of funds? It may be argued that the wrongdoing is 
disloyalty, and it does not matter what the underlying circumstances or 
consequences are for further distinctions to be made. 
48 Relatedly, it may be queried: How is an assessment for 
reparative compensation by way of surcharging of account different 
from an assessment for equitable compensation that bypasses the 
surcharging of account? Glister points out that the trustee’s duty to 
                                                          
113 Youyang v Minter Ellison Morris Fletcher [2003] HCA 15 at [39]. For this reason, 
the High Court of Australia doubted (in obiter) that negligent trustees should be 
able to benefit from the application of common law principles of remoteness in the 
determination of extent of their liability. 
114 Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 266. 
115 In Hasler v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd [2014] NSWCA 266 (“Hasler”), Barrett and 
Gleeson JJA analysed the case as simply concerning equitable compensation for 
breach of fiduciary duty, without reference to the accounting rules. Leeming JA, on 
the other hand, thought that (see Hasler at [152]): 
… this would appear to accord with the position under the traditional form of 
account, because the findings would warrant a surcharge for wilful default for 
the Almad mark-up following the misapplication of Optus funds. 
 Whilst the mark-up might be considered a disbursement of company funds, the 
case involved no more than an employee who had the authority to enter into 
contracts on behalf of the company – essentially, a case of agency. It should not 
have triggered the application of accounting rules as this was not a case of breach 
of custodial duty. 
116 See BigTinCan Pty Ltd v Ramsay [2014] NSWCA 324. Cf Agricultural Land 
Management Ltd v Jackson (No 2) [2014] WASC 102. 
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account is limited to the assets under his management,117 thereby 
imposing a limitation on the extent to which the court is able to take 
into account the claimant’s economic position in awarding reparative 
compensation. As such, he suggests that if the accounting basis is 
removed, this will “remove the inherent restriction” on the recovery of 
consequential loss.118 There are, however, no cases that affirmatively 
demonstrate the difference in quantum. 
C. AIB decision: Rejecting traditional accounting rules 
49 Even more interestingly, in AIB, the UK Supreme Court rejected 
outright the application of the accounting principles even in breach of 
trust cases. In that case, the defendant solicitors acted in a remortgage 
transaction in which AIB Group (“AIB”) was advancing £3.3m to 
finance the borrowers’ business, in exchange for a security over their 
home which was valued at £4.5m and subject to a pre-existing mortgage 
in favour of Barclays Bank for a £1.5m loan. The defendant solicitors 
were instructed by AIB to redeem the Barclays Bank mortgage out of the 
loan moneys before completion and to obtain a first mortgage over the 
property. Funds were accordingly transferred to the solicitors who held 
it on trust for AIB. Notwithstanding having been instructed on the 
total redemption figure, owing to subsequent miscommunication, the 
solicitors transferred to Barclays Bank a figure that was approximately 
£309,000 short of the total redemption figure. The balance funds were 
remitted to the borrowers. On account of the shortfall, Barclays Bank 
refused to release its charge. The borrowers also failed to return the 
extra £309,000. Having been informed of the error, AIB negotiated with 
Barclays Bank and ultimately obtained a second charge over the 
property. 
50 The borrowers subsequently defaulted, and the property was 
sold for only £1.2m. After paying off the £309,000 that was due to 
Barclays Bank, AIB only obtained £867,697. The appeal before the 
Supreme Court concerned the sole issue of assessment of equitable 
compensation for breach of trust.119 AIB contended that the solicitors 
were liable for approximately £2.5m, which was the difference between 
the loan and the amount it ultimately recovered. The solicitors argued 
that AIB was only entitled to £275,000, which was the loss it suffered by 
comparison with what it would have received had they fully carried out 
                                                          
117 See also Agricultural Land Management Ltd v Jackson (No 2) [2014] WASC 102 
at [409], per Edelman J. 
118 Jamie Glister, “Breach of Trust and Consequential Loss” (2014) 8 J Eq 235. 
119 AIB Group brought actions for breach of trust, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of 
contract and negligence. 
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AIB’s instructions. The Supreme Court unanimously found in favour of 
the defendant solicitors. 
51 The Supreme Court endorsed Target Holdings whole-heartedly. 
Lord Toulson was highly critical of the alternative and more popular 
substitutive award account of the outcome in Target Holdings, 
considering it to be a legal “fairy tale”.120 He stressed that “[m]onetary 
compensation whether classified as restitutive or reparative, is intended 
to make good a loss”.121 He emphasised that a commercial trust differs 
materially from a family trust because the former arises from a contract 
which “defines the parameters of the trust”.122 Lord Toulson further 
commented that:123 
… in circumstances such as those in Target Holdings the extent of 
equitable compensation should be the same as if damages for breach of 
contract were sought at common law. 
52 Lord Toulson’s reasoning was clearly forged upon a distinction 
drawn between the commercial and non-commercial context.124 In the 
commercial context, Lord Toulson’s analysis accords primacy to contract 
in the governance of the parties’ relationship. This is not entirely 
consistent with Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s commercial and non-
commercial distinction in Target Holdings: the trigger for the distinction 
is different. Lord Browne-Wilkinson had held that, unlike a family trust, 
a party in a commercial trust is not entitled to the reconstitution of the 
trust fund once the underlying commercial transaction has been 
completed. The underlying rationale of reconstitution is that “no one 
beneficiary is entitled to the trust property and the need to compensate 
all beneficiaries for the trust”125 – a basis that is irrelevant for a 
commercial bare trust in cases like Target Holdings and AIB. But it is 
imperative to note that the transaction in Target Holdings was 
“completed” because the sought-for security was obtained, albeit 
belatedly. The same was, however, not achieved in AIB: a different 
security was executed. Lord Toulson nevertheless said that a transaction 
                                                          
120 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [69]. 
121 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [73]. 
Cf Agricultural Land Management v Jackson (No 2) [2014] WASC 102 at [344], 
per Edelman J. Edelman J explained that the kind of loss which substitutive 
compensation seeks to redress is the loss of having the trust being performed in an 
authorised manner; the loss which reparative compensation seeks to redress is the 
loss of trust funds, a concept of loss which has its counterpart in common law. 
122 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [70]–[71]. 
123 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [70]–[71]. 
124 See Purrunsing v A’Court & Co [2016] EWHC 81 at [42]. 
125 Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] AC 421 at 434–436. Cf Youyang v Minter 
Ellison Morris Fletcher [2003] HCA 15 at [49]. The High Court of Australia 
disagreed that different remedial principles should apply depending on the 
context. 
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was “completed” when the loan moneys was released to the borrowers 
even though the objective of the transaction had yet to be or was not 
ultimately achieved.126 Lord Toulson’s analysis is steeped in commercial 
pragmatism – there is no need for reconstitution of the trust fund if the 
compensation could be paid directly to AIB. 
53 In contrast, Lord Reed’s analysis proceeded from the vantage 
point of examining the consistency and justifiable differences between 
common law and equity.127 His reasoning did not depend upon a 
distinction to be drawn between commercial and traditional trusts,128 
although he did affirm that a trust which is part of the machinery for 
the performance of a contract is of relevance in determining the loss 
occasioned by a breach of trust.129 This is because Lord Reed interpreted 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s distinction between commercial and traditional 
trusts to result in a difference in the procedure of payment as opposed 
to the quantum of payment.130 Lord Reed considered the suggestion that 
a beneficiary could recover more than he has in fact lost by reason of the 
breach to be preposterous and unprincipled.131 
54 Controversially,132 AIB was an outright rejection of the 
traditional accounting rules in the commercial context.133 On 
Lord Toulson’s judgment, it may be that the accounting rules remain 
relevant and applicable for traditional trusts. On Lord Reed’s analysis, 
however, there is scope to argue that the accounting rules are now 
obsolete for breach of trust, whether arising in the commercial or 
traditional context. Interestingly, AIB appears to be the equitable 
counterpart of Bunge SA v Nidera BV,134 a contract case in which the 
UK Supreme Court unreservedly affirmed the compensatory principle, 
that is, the innocent party is only entitled to compensation for losses 
actually suffered.135 The recent affirmation of the compensatory 
                                                          
126 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [74]. 
127 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [78]–[89] 
and [136]–[138]. 
128 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [102]. 
129 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [137]. 
130 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [108]. 
131 AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 3 WLR 1367 at [107]. 
132 See Hon William Gummow AC, “Three Cases of Misapplication of a Solicitor’s 
Trust Account” (2015) 41 Aust Bar Rev 5. 
133 Perhaps the Supreme Court was trying to avoid the draconian result of making the 
solicitors insurers against losses arising from market downturn. On appeal, it was 
unchallenged that the misapplication related to £2.5m instead of £309,000. Had the 
Supreme Court upheld substitutive compensation, the solicitors would be liable to 
pay £2.5m. 
134 [2015] UKSC 43; [2015] 3 All ER 1082. 
135 A strictly compensatory analysis of the common law remedies is, however, 
incorrect. See Justice Edelman, “An English Misturning with Equitable 
Compensation” UNSW Australia Colloquium on Equitable Compensation and 
(cont’d on the next page) 
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principle in contract law might have eclipsed the important fact that 
debt at common law continues to exist. It may also be that the AIB 
decision appeals to the hard core contractarian pragmatics for a 
different reason: certainty in commercial cases. Indeed, how the 
equitable accounting process operates is not entirely clear.136 Part of the 
confusion and complexity arises from issues of characterisation and 
the precise degrees of permissibility for waiver and substitution of 
alternative benefits. AIB is a case that stands between Target Holdings, 
where the sought-for security was ultimately obtained, and Youyang, 
where the sought-for security was not obtained and nothing else was 
obtained. In AIB, by contrast, there was an alternative benefit, in the 
form of a second charge, which was procured in pursuance to AIB’s own 
negotiations with Barclays Bank. But if one were to adopt a contractual 
compensation analysis, the answer is rather straightforward: the second 
charge could be seen as a reasonable step of mitigation undertaken by 
AIB and which must be taken into account in assessing compensation 
for loss. 
D. Reflections 
55 Where should Singapore law go from here? There are at least 
three possibilities. The first is simply to broadly follow Coomaraswamy J’s 
approach in Then Khek Koon (2013) with some refinements. This 
approach reflects the core tenets of the fiduciary doctrine. The second is 
to follow the traditional accounting approach which applies accounting 
rules in cases of breach of trust and breach of custodial duties by 
custodial fiduciaries. Such an approach reflects the core tenets of the 
trust doctrine, but some uncertainties, as raised above, await 
clarification. The third is to depart from tradition and follow the AIB 
approach,137 but Singapore courts must decide whether the accounting 
rules are abrogated in all cases of breach of trust or only in commercial 
                                                                                                                               
Disgorgement of Profit (7–8 August 2015), available at <http://www.fedcourt. 
gov.au/publications/judges-speeches/justice-edelman/edelman-j-201508> (accessed 
27 March 2016). 
136 Lusina Ho, “Equitable Compensation on the Road to Damascus?” (2015) 
131 LQR 213. Even on the facts of Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns [1996] 1 AC 421 
where the common understanding is that it could be explained by way of 
falsification of account, academics differed as to the precise operation of the 
process. See James Edelman, “Money Awards of the Cost of Performance” (2010) 
4 J Eq 122 at 128–130. Cf Matthew Conaglen, “Explaining Target Holdings v 
Redferns” (2010) 4 J Eq 288. 
137 In the later English High Court decision of Various Claimants v Giambrone & Law 
[2015] EWHC 1946 (see Appendix 3 (Supplemental Judgment) at [7]), Foskett J 
found it difficult to articulate the combined effect of Target Holdings Ltd v Redferns 
[1996] 1 AC 421 and AIB Group (UK) plc v Mark Redler & Co Solicitors [2014] 
3 WLR 1367 (which unreservedly affirmed Target Holdings), as the judgments are 
“extensive and, in some respects, complex”. 
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trust cases. If the former, it would follow that equitable compensation 
for breach of fiduciary duty is concerned with making good losses 
caused by the breach. If the latter, the further query is whether the 
accounting rules remain also relevant for fiduciary relationships arising 
from the non-commercial context. 
56 Presently, under Singapore law, there are hints of applying the 
accounting principles for breach of trust cases,138 although an occasion 
for fully considering the substantive aspects of the principles has yet to 
arise. Difficult conceptual and theoretical questions must be grappled 
with: (a) what is the narrative for the local trust law and local fiduciary 
law; (b) is custodianship important and justifies separate treatment; and 
(c) does the fiduciary doctrine retain its unique equitable foundation 
and therefore to be distinguished from contractual principles? 
57 It is with these questions relating to equitable compensation in 
mind that we now turn to consider account of profits, also derived from 
the trustee’s primary obligation to account for his stewardship and later 
exported for application in non-trustee fiduciary contexts. We shall see 
that the Singapore courts, unlike their approach in relation to equitable 
compensation, apply a “strict” approach without general regard to the 
specific facts of the case, save for the exceptional availability of equitable 
allowance. In particular, there appears to be no investigation as to 
causation, much less differentiating the assessment principles based on 
the type of breach or fiduciary. In Part IV, we examine the principles 
relating to account of profits under Singapore law and suggest that the 
differences between equitable compensation and account of profits are 
not as disparate as at first sight appear. We will also consider areas that 
should be clarified and possibly reformed in the future. 
IV. Account of profits 
A. The traditional view 
58 It is trite law that a defaulting fiduciary is required to disgorge 
unauthorised profits.139 The remedial objective is to prevent fiduciaries 
from coming into any (potential or actual) conflict between their duties 
                                                          
138 See Cheong Soh Chin v Eng Chiet Shoong [2015] SGHC 173 at [40]–[42] and 
Chng Weng Wah v Goh Bak Heng [2016] 2 SLR 464 at [20]–[24] (on whether the 
defendant is under a duty to give a full account). 
139 Peter Devonshire, “Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (2010) 32 Syd 
L Rev 389. Because Singapore law derives much of its content in this area from the 
English position, this part commences with a brief discussion of the English 
approach in this area of law. See generally James Penner, “Distinguishing 
Fiduciary, Trust, and Accounting Relationships” (2014) 8 J Eq 202. 
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and personal interests.140 Disgorgement may be effected by way of a 
constructive trust or the personal remedy of an account of profits. The 
former is available if the relevant assets remain identifiable,141 which is 
particularly significant where the errant fiduciary is insolvent. Our focus 
in this section is on the personal remedy of account. But it is important 
to note that the broad purpose underlying the account of profits and the 
constructive trust is the same and to that extent, cases on constructive 
trust will be drawn upon in our analysis. 
59 Just as the imposition of a constructive trust is traditionally 
regarded as “strict”,142 so too is the duty to account. The genesis of this 
“strictness” is Keech v Sandford,143 where the trustee’s renewal of the 
lease (in his own name) originally held on trust for an infant was found 
to be in breach of fiduciary duty and the lease was determined by the 
court to be held on trust for the infant.144 Lord King in Keech v Sandford 
explained that it is “very proper that the rule should be strictly pursued, 
and not in the least relaxed”, lest there be dire consequences.145 This 
developed into a general principle that fiduciaries cannot profit 
personally from their position. 
60 The duty to account is triggered by the mere fact that 
unauthorised profits have been earned, as this gives rise to a breach of 
the no-profit rule.146 There is no need to prove that there is a potential or 
actual conflict of duty and interests. The court does not investigate into 
the motives or bona fides of the fiduciary, nor does it consider whether 
the profits would have otherwise gone to the principal, because these are 
matters that are generally difficult to ascertain and are usually solely 
                                                          
140 Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (London: Routledge, 8th Ed, 2015) at p 598. 
141 Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (London: Routledge, 8th Ed, 2015) at p 611. 
Hudson considers that a constructive trust is the primary remedy for effecting the 
duty to account for profits earned in breach of fiduciary duty; the account is a 
secondary remedy. 
142 More recently, the English Court of Appeal reconsidered the “strictness” of the law 
in imposing a constructive trust as a remedy for breach of fiduciary duty in Sinclair 
Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd [2012] Ch 453, suggesting that 
a distinction should be made between cases involving abuse of property and cases 
involving mere abuse of position. However, the position has since been overruled 
by the UK Supreme Court in FHR European Ventures LLP v Mankarious [2013] 
3 WLR 466. See generally Alvin W-L See, “Unauthorised Fiduciary Gains and the 
Constructive Trust” (2016) 28 SAcLJ 1014. 
143 (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61. 
144 While the authority of Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61 for this proposition 
has been doubted, it remains beyond doubt now that unauthorised profits are held 
on constructive trust for the beneficiary: see Andrew Hicks, “The Remedial 
Principle in Keech v Sandford Reconsidered” (2010) 69 Camb LJ 287. 
145 Keech v Sandford (1726) Sel Cas Ch 61 at 62. 
146 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 at 144–145, per Lord Roskill. 
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within the knowledge of the wrongdoer.147 Even if the principal could 
never have obtained the benefit in question, the liability to account 
arises so long as the benefit was obtained by reason of the fiduciary’s 
position.148 The fiduciary’s liability to account remains, even if he could 
prove that informed consent would have been given by the principal had 
he asked.149 
61 The absolute strictness of the duty to account for unauthorised 
profits is clearly underlined by the objective of deterrence.150 The only 
concession to that strictness is the exceptional availability of an award of 
equitable allowance. In Boardman v Phipps, the House of Lords awarded 
the fiduciary equitable allowance on a “liberal scale” for his effort and 
skill in exploiting a business opportunity that he came by because of his 
fiduciary position, which profited the beneficiaries. The award was 
made because the fiduciary had breached his duty in good faith. 
Nevertheless, the award contradicts the strictness of the primary duty to 
account, but it has been explained that equitable allowance should only 
be ordered where “it cannot have the effect of encouraging trustees in 
any way to put themselves in a position where their interests conflict 
with their duties as trustees”.151 
62 In this part of the discussion, we seek to enhance our 
understanding of account of profits by studying the interrelationship 
of deterrence, causation, as well as honesty and good faith. We shall 
show, as with equitable compensation, that these are considerations 
undergirding the gain-based remedy. But unlike equitable compensation, 
these considerations are expressed differently within the analytical 
framework. 
                                                          
147 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134 at 154, per Lord Wright. 
148 Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 134; Boardman v Phipps [1967] 
2 AC 46. 
149 Murad v Al Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959. 
150 Cf Lionel Smith, “Deterrence, Prophylaxis and Punishment in Fiduciary 
Obligations” (2013) 7 J Eq 87 and Lionel Smith, “Fiduciary Relationships: Ensuring 
the Loyal Exercise of Judgment on Behalf of Another” (2014) 130 LQR 608  
at 627–628. Smith challenges the convention of explaining the no-profit rule on the 
basis of prophylaxis or deterrence. Instead, he explains the no-profit rule as a rule 
of attribution: “it attributes everything in the sphere of fiduciary management to 
the beneficiary”, for the simple reason that the fiduciary has undertaken to act for 
and on behalf of the principal. Smith’s account of the rule is one that is 
independent from the no-conflict rule and not activated by wrongdoing. However, 
Smith’s account is not without difficulties: see Man Yip, “Singapore’s Remedial 
Constructive Trust: Lessons from Australia?” (2014) 8 J Eq 77 at 103–104 and 
James E Penner, “Distinguishing Fiduciary, Trust, and Accounting Relationships” 
(2014) 8 J Eq 202 at 230–233. 
151 Guinness plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663 at 700–701, per Lord Goff. 
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B. Singapore developments 
63 The Court of Appeal recently examined the principles for 
account of profits and equitable allowance in Mona Computer Systems 
(S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan152 (“Mona Computer”), an appeal on 
assessment. In the original trial concerning liability,153 the appellant, 
who was a computer software company, had sued the respondent, who 
was an employee of the appellant, for breach of fiduciary duties. The 
High Court found that the employee had breached his fiduciary duties 
when he diverted contracts to his own rival company (“MN”). It thus 
ordered the employee to account for any profits he personally made 
from the diverted contracts.154 At the assessment stage, the assistant 
registrar found that the account should include the employee’s share of 
the net profit that MN had made from the diverted contracts, and also 
the commission due to him by MN. However, the assistant registrar did 
not include the director’s fees and salary that MN paid to the employee. 
64 The High Court overruled the assistant registrar’s decision. The 
court found that the employee was entitled to keep the commission paid 
to him by MN because, had the contracts remained with the principal 
company, the latter would have had to pay the employee the commission 
anyway. The High Court was of the view that the company would enjoy 
an unexpected windfall if the employee were made to account for that 
commission. 
65 The Court of Appeal allowed the company’s appeal. Notably, on 
appeal, the employee also raised the issue of whether he was entitled to 
an equitable allowance for his effort in generating MN’s profits. It may 
be useful to consider the Court of Appeal’s decision along three issues,155 
namely, (a) whether there are any limitations on the scope of account, in 
particular, whether causation has a role; (b) whether equitable allowance 
should be used liberally to compensate the breaching fiduciary’s effort 
and skill; and – underlying both of these issues – (c) whether there 
should be, broadly speaking, a relaxation of equity’s traditionally strict 
approach to the accountability of benefits and if so, in what manner. 
                                                          
152 [2014] 1 SLR 847. 
153 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Chandran Meenakumari [2011] 1 SLR 310. 
154 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Chandran Meenakumari [2011] 1 SLR 310 
at [22]. 
155 See, eg, Mitchell McInnes, “Account of Profits for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” 
(2006) 122 LQR 11 at 12–13. 
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(1) Limitations on the scope of account? 
66 There are two approaches to account of profits, as explained by 
Upjohn J in In re Javies (decd):156 
One approach, more favourable to the fiduciary, is that he should be 
held liable to account as constructive trustee not of the entire business 
but of the particular benefits which flowed to him in breach of his 
duty. Another approach, less favourable to the fiduciary, is that he 
should be held accountable for the entire business and its profits, due 
allowance being made for the time, energy, skill, and financial 
contribution that he has expended or made. 
67 The Court of Appeal in Mona Computer clearly preferred the 
stricter approach, citing Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver157 and Industrial 
Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley.158 It reversed the High Court’s 
decision not to include the commission as part of the account of profits, 
emphasising that an account of profits is a gains-based remedy that is 
concerned with the disgorgement of unauthorised profits – it is not 
concerned with the restitution or compensation of the principal.159 
There is no investigation into what might have happened had there been 
no breach so as to determine the relevant deductions to be made.160 
Accordingly, the remedy envisages that the principal may gain a 
“windfall”.161 The only question is whether the profit earned could be 
attributed to the breach of duty. 
68 Applied to the facts of the case, the Court of Appeal held that it 
was irrelevant that the company would likely have paid the employee the 
same amount of commission had the employee remained in the 
company’s employment and not breached his fiduciary duties. Instead, 
because the commission earned by the employee from MN was derived 
from the profits that MN earned from the diverted contracts, it was 
connected to the profits to be accounted.162 Furthermore, although 
neither party pursued the point on appeal, the Court of Appeal also 
noted that the employee should have to account for the director’s fees 
received from MN. This is because the funding for those fees was 
                                                          
156 [1958] 1 WLR 815 at 820. See also Denis S K Ong, “Breach of Fiduciary Duty: The 
Alternative Remedies” (1999) 11 Bond L Rev 336 at 346. 
157 [1967] 2 AC 134. 
158 [1972] 1 WLR 443. 
159 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 
at [13]. 
160 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 
at [18]. 
161 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 
at [16]. 
162 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 
at [18]. 
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derived from profits earned from the diverted contracts that were 
obtained as a result of the employee’s breach of fiduciary duties. 
(2) Equitable allowance 
69 In Mona Computer, in support of his claim for an award of 
equitable allowance, the employee cited Boardman v Phipps163 
(“Boardman”) and Paul A Davies (Aust) Pty Ltd v Davies (No 2)164 
(“Davies”). The Court of Appeal, however, rejected the claim and said 
that the authorities could be distinguished. 
70 According to the Court of Appeal, Boardman concerned a very 
“different situation” as the fiduciaries there (including Boardman) had 
purchased shares in good faith in their personal capacities.165 While 
finding that the fiduciaries had to account to the trust the profits 
derived in breach of their duties, the English High Court granted the 
fiduciaries “an allowance for their work and skill”.166 In doing so, it held 
that it would otherwise be “inequitable” for the trust to retain the profits 
without paying anything for the fiduciaries’ risk and skill in obtaining 
those profits in the first place.167 The House of Lords ultimately upheld 
the English High Court’s decision.168 As for Davies, while the Court of 
Appeal acknowledged that the case was “somewhat more generous to 
the directors”, it also thought that it involved “slightly different 
considerations”.169 In Davies, the directors had purchased personal 
property using a mixture of their company’s money and also borrowed 
money on their personal guarantees. The New South Wales Court of 
Appeal held that a constructive trust arose over the entirety of the 
appreciated value of the property. However, the court then granted an 
allowance to the directors for their effort and expertise expended on 
improving the price of the property.170 The basis of the court’s decision 
was that the directors “were not guilty of conscious wrongdoing”.171 
                                                          
163 [1964] 1 WLR 993. 
164 [1982] 8 ACLR 1. 
165 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 
at [20]. Cf Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1994–1995) 182 CLR 544; (1995) 
128 ALR 201 (“Warman”). In Warman, the leading Australian authority on 
equitable allowance, the High Court of Australia ordered an account of profits 
subject to allowances for the errant fiduciary’s skill, effort and resources, even 
though the fiduciary was in deliberate breach of his fiduciary duties. 
166 Boardman v Phipps [1964] 1 WLR 993 at 1018. 
167 Boardman v Phipps [1964] 1 WLR 993 at 1018. 
168 Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 at 104. 
169 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 
at [21]. 
170 Paul A Davies (Aust) Pty Ltd v Davies (No 2) [1983] 8 ACLR 1 at 8. 
171 Paul A Davies (Aust) Pty Ltd v Davies (No 2) [1983] 8 ACLR 1 at 8. 
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71 The Court of Appeal emphasised that “the power to grant an 
allowance to a fiduciary in breach should be exercised sparingly in order 
not to encourage fiduciaries to act in breach of their duties”.172 Thus, any 
allowance for skill and work is only awarded exceptionally.173 Relevantly, 
the Court of Appeal regarded the fiduciary’s good faith as a “hugely 
relevant consideration” in the exercise of the power174 but it is not the 
sole criterion. It must also be shown that the fiduciary has expended 
skill, effort and/or resources in generating the profits. At present, it is 
uncertain if there are any further criteria under Singapore law. 
72 On the facts of Mona Computer, the Court of Appeal accorded 
credence to the fact that the liability to account concerned sums wholly 
attributable to the employee’s breach of his fiduciary duties. After all, the 
employee diverted existing contracts with the principal, not potential 
opportunities that he had to develop in order for the profits to be 
earned. As such, the employee was not entitled to an equitable allowance 
from the profits derived from the diverted contracts. Moreover, the 
employee had clearly acted in bad faith by setting up a rival company 
while being the key employee of the company.175 
(3) No scope for relaxing the strict approach? 
73 Mona Computer demonstrates that under Singapore law, the 
primary duty to account is unyieldingly stringent, with no concern for 
causation or good faith on the part of the errant fiduciary. Those 
concerns are addressed within the narrow and exceptional jurisdiction 
to award an allowance. It seems that Singapore law would be disinclined 
against a relaxation of the strict approach. Yet, it may be argued that 
Mona Computer was not the proper case for consideration of any 
relaxation given that the facts concerned neither a fiduciary who 
breached his duty in good faith nor one who contributed by way of his 
own skill, effort or other resources towards the generation of the 
unauthorised profits. It was a case that called for a straightforward 
application of the traditional approach. But there are cases that do not. 
For this reason, we suggest below some points that merit fuller 
consideration in future disputes. 
                                                          
172 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 
at [23]. 
173 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 
at [24]. 
174 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 
at [26]. 
175 Mona Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 
at [27]–[28]. 
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C. Points for future consideration 
(1) Limitations on the primary duty to account 
74 An inherent limitation of the fiduciary’s primary liability to 
account is the scope of his duty of loyalty.176 In Warman International 
Ltd v Dwyer,177 the High Court of Australia said: “Ordinarily a fiduciary 
will be ordered to render an account of the profits made within the 
scope and ambit of his duty.”178 It is obvious that a fiduciary should only 
be liable to account “for a profit or benefit if it was obtained … by 
reason of his taking advantage of [an] opportunity or knowledge derived 
from his fiduciary position”.179 This limitation is generally integrated 
into the anterior question of whether there is a breach of fiduciary duty 
and does not normally warrant independent analysis. Conceptually, the 
analysis is focused on whether the profit is attributable to the breach of 
duty. The primary duty to account is not otherwise dependent on any 
notion of causation.180 We shall return to the relevance of causation 
momentarily. 
75 Under Australian law, there is some suggestion that 
“unconscionability” may be a limitation. Deane J commented in Kak 
Loui Chan v Zacharia181 that:182 
[T]he liability to account for a personal benefit or gain obtained or 
received by use or by reason of fiduciary position, opportunity or 
knowledge will not arise in circumstances where it would be 
unconscientious to assert it or in which, for example, there is no 
possible conflict between personal interest and fiduciary duty and it is 
plainly in the interests of the person to whom the fiduciary duty is 
owed that the fiduciary obtain for himself rights or benefits. 
This may be no more than saying that the profits (implicitly) fall within 
the scope of the arrangement between the principal and the fiduciary, 
thereby negativing any breach of fiduciary duty in the first place. 
Alternatively, it may be that the account must be fashioned in 
                                                          
176 Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959 at [57]; Novoship (UK) Ltd v Nikitin 
[2014] EWCA Civ 908 at [109]. 
177 (1994–1995) 182 CLR 544. 
178 Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1994–1995) 182 CLR 544 at 559; (1995) 
128 ALR 201 at 210. 
179 Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1994–1995) 182 CLR 544 at 557; (1995) 
128 ALR 201 at 209. 
180 Novoship (UK) Ltd v Nikitin [2014] EWCA Civ 908 at [96] and [109]. 
181 (1984) 154 CLR 178. 
182 Kak Loui Chan v Zacharia (1984) 154 CLR 178 at 204–205, cited in Warman 
International Ltd v Dwyer [1995] 128 ALR 201 at 210. 
© 2016 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law. 
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
 Equitable Compensation and Account of Profits  
(2016) 28 SAcLJ for Breach of Fiduciary Duty 915 
 
accordance with the type of fiduciary relations,183 consistent with the 
Then Khek Koon (2013) approach in respect of equitable compensation. 
On either interpretation, it is important that the basis for differentiation 
is articulated clearly, instead of being shrouded by the label 
“unconscionability”. Finally, the account of profits, being an equitable 
remedy, may be defeated by defences such as “estoppel, laches, 
acquiescence and delay”.184 
(2) The limits of the jurisdiction to award equitable allowance and 
its interplay with the scope of account 
76 It is important to consider the principles relating to the primary 
duty to account and the discretionary jurisdiction to award equitable 
allowance together because the latter mitigates the strictness of the 
former. But there is first a need to determine the scope of the court’s 
jurisdiction to award an allowance. Under Singapore law, good faith is a 
significant consideration. Good faith, as a threshold requirement, 
diminishes the contradiction between an allowance and the deterrent 
effect of the strictness of the account. After all, deterrence is less relevant 
against a fiduciary who breached his duty in good faith believing that he 
was acting in the best interests of the principal. Conversely, deterrence is 
most needed in cases of deliberate breaches. But what is less clear is 
what amounts to good faith for the purpose of claiming equitable 
allowance. Surely it is not enough to show that the fiduciary intended to 
benefit the principal and that the principal did benefit from the breach. 
This would not encourage the strict observance of fiduciary duties. 
Moreover, the proper way for a fiduciary to earn from his position is to 
seek informed consent from the principal, instead of breaching his duty 
with the hope of being awarded an allowance from the profits made. In 
Boardman v Phipps, informed consent could not be obtained because 
one of the trustees was senile.185 
77 Further, the allowance is granted on account of the fiduciary’s 
effort, skill and resources. The requirement of effort, skill and resources 
conceals the limited role of causation in the remedial regime. Indeed, 
the award of allowance acknowledges that part of the profits is 
attributable to the fiduciary’s effort, skill and resources. The court may 
assess the award by way of a percentage of the total net profits earned, 
though there is no rule that it must do so. Causation has a limited role 
because an equitable allowance is not available where profits are earned 
                                                          
183 See also Coomber v Coomber [1911] 1 Ch 723 at 728 (on courts interfering and 
setting aside acts). 
184 Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1994–1995) 182 CLR 544 at 559; (1995) 
128 ALR 201 at 210. 
185 Michael Bryan, “Boardman v Phipps (1967)” in Landmark Cases in Equity (Charles 
Mitchell & Paul Mitchell eds) (Hart Publishing, 2012) at p 582. 
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by reason of mere good fortune. There is no reason an allowance cannot 
be awarded in cases where the fiduciary has invested his own resources 
in the form of property, for instance, profits were generated from the 
investment of a mixture of the fiduciary’s money and the principal’s 
money. What is less clear is a case where the fiduciary has used the 
principal’s money solely in generating the profits though he has invested 
his own effort and skill in the process. Should abuse of property cases be 
distinguished from abuse of opportunity cases?186 Does it depend on 
whether the fiduciary is a custodial fiduciary and misapplication of 
property is thus a breach of its core duty? It may be that in a great 
number of these cases, the award of allowance is unavailable for the 
simple reason that the breach was deliberate. But the court cannot shy 
away from properly considering the factors that are relevant to the 
exercise of the discretion to award an allowance. 
78 Part of the exercise would require an examination of the 
conceptual basis of the power to award equitable allowance. Birks 
explained the award of allowance on the basis of counter-restitution.187 
A plaintiff claiming restitution for unjust enrichment must not be left 
unjustly enriched at the expense of the defendant as a result of 
succeeding on his claim: counter-restitution is thus required. It is 
assumed that the defence of counter-restitution is equally applicable to 
restitution for wrongs.188 However, in Re Berkely Applegate (Investment 
Consultants) Ltd,189 the English High Court explained the power to 
award allowance on the basis that “he who seeks equity must do 
equity”.190 On such an analysis, the power rests on broader principles of 
justice and, if so, it is possible to admit a greater range of factors than 
possible under a counter-restitution analysis. 
79 It is apparent from the above discussion that factors which 
courts refuse to take into account under the anterior stage of 
determining the scope of account are considered at the posterior stage 
of determining the availability of equitable allowance. The interplay 
between the two stages must not be missed. The “strictness” of the scope 
of account is mitigated and therefore related to the scope of the 
jurisdiction to award allowance. The greater the range of factors under 
the second stage, the wider the jurisdiction to award equitable 
allowance, in turn rendering the account of profits less “strict”. 
                                                          
186 Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1994–1995) 182 CLR 544 at 560–561; (1995) 
128 ALR 201 at 211–212. 
187 Peter Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 
1989) at p 420. 
188 Andrew Burrows, The Law of Restitution (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2011) 
at pp 696–697. 
189 [1989] 1 Ch 32. 
190 Re Berkely Applegate (Investment Consultants) Ltd [1989] 1 Ch 32 at 36–37. 
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(3) Framework of analysis: Two-stage approach or one-stage 
approach? 
80 This brings us to a related point to ponder: whether a two-stage 
framework of analysis should be replaced by a single-stage approach of 
conferring upon the courts a broad equitable discretion to apportion the 
profits between the fiduciary and beneficiary. The main practical 
difference between these approaches is the burden of proof. Under the 
two-stage analysis, the legal burden is on the beneficiary to establish the 
claim for an account. However, if the fiduciary seeks an award of 
equitable allowance, he bears the burden to establish such a claim,191 
which enhances the deterrent effect of the account. It can also directly 
lessen the reputational cost of a finding that there has been a breach of 
fiduciary duty.192 
81 Recent cases have not departed from the two-stage approach, 
but have questioned its continued application. In Murad v Al-Saraj, 
Arden LJ, like Lord Upjohn in Boardman v Phipps, suggested that equity 
“has been able skilfully to adapt remedies against defaulting trustees or 
fiduciaries so as to meet the justice of the case”.193 The implication of the 
statement, as Arden LJ illustrated by reference to Shaw v Holland,194 is 
that “a court of equity will fix the measure of damages against a 
defaulting but innocent trustee more leniently than it would otherwise 
have done”.195 Jonathan Parker LJ wondered whether “commercial 
conduct which in 1874 was thought to imperil the safety of mankind 
[must] necessarily be regarded nowadays with the same depth of 
concern”,196 and Clarke LJ also considered that “the time has come when 
the court should revisit the inflexible rule of equity”.197 These sentiments 
point towards a one-stage approach that directly addresses factors such 
as causation and honesty and allows the courts to apportion the profits 
between the principal and fiduciary accordingly. 
                                                          
191 Harris v Digital Pulse Pty Ltd [2003] NSWCA 10 at [321], per Heydon JA; Mona 
Computer Systems (S) Pte Ltd v Singaravelu Murugan [2014] 1 SLR 847 at [28]. 
192 Michael Bryan, “Boardman v Phipps (1967)” in Landmark Cases in Equity (Charles 
Mitchell & Paul Mitchell eds) (Hart Publishing, 2012) at p 609. 
193 Murad v Al-Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959 at [81]. 
194 [1900] 2 Ch 305. 
195 Murad v Al Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959 at [81]. In particular, Arden LJ pointed 
out (at [83]) that that modern courts, equipped with extensive powers under the 
UK Civil Procedure Rules to direct that information be given of a party’s case, are 
well equipped to conduct hypothetical inquiries necessary to “ensure that remedies 
are proportionate to the justice of [each] case”. 
196 Murad v Al Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959 at [121]. 
197 Murad v Al Saraj [2005] EWCA Civ 959 at [158]. 
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82 Yet another example of the courts’ desire for flexibility is the 
case of Foster v Bryant.198 The defendant co-director was forced to resign 
by his company, controlled by his fellow co-director. After he had 
tendered his resignation but before he left the company, a client 
discussed with him the possibility of working with them after his 
resignation took effect. When the defendant joined the client afterwards, 
the company sued him for failing to direct the corporate opportunity to 
it. It was argued that he should be made to account for any profits made 
out of this opportunity. Rix LJ held that the defendant was not so liable 
because he had already resigned and played no active role in the 
company. More broadly, he distinguished the case from existing 
authorities as the latter concerned fiduciaries who actively took 
advantage of their principals. 
83 There are nevertheless forceful arguments against moving 
towards a more flexible approach, one that may be achieved by way of a 
single-stage “fact-sensitive” framework. First, the adoption of a “fact-
sensitive” approach would render uncertain the primary liability to 
account for profits (as well as the imposition of a constructive trust).199 
The likely uncertainty would diminish the strong deterrent effect of the 
remedy. Secondly, the strictness of the duty to account is mitigated by 
the discretionary award of equitable allowance.200 Thirdly, the legal 
burden under a single-stage framework rests entirely on the beneficiary 
to establish the scope of the fiduciary’s liability, which not only reduces 
the deterrent effect but also places an unfair burden on the principal to 
prove matters that are usually within the knowledge and control of the 
fiduciary. Unlike common law, equity generally favours the innocent 
party over the wrongdoer. Finally, a single-stage “fact-sensitive” analysis 
has the potential of fudging the relevance and priority of the different 
factors.201 
84 Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the two-stage 
framework of analysis suffers from some weaknesses. First, the 
two-stage approach better enables the courts to conceal the real reasons 
for reducing the scope of account through the language of equitable 
allowance and discretion. A single-stage approach would force the 
courts to explicitly articulate the factors informing the exercise of 
discretion, such as causation, honesty and good faith etc. 
85 Secondly, a two-stage framework causes some degree of 
incoherence within the remedial regime for account of profits. The duty 
                                                          
198 [2007] Bus LR 1565. 
199 Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (London: Routledge, 8th Ed, 2015) at p 619. 
200 Alastair Hudson, Equity and Trusts (London: Routledge, 8th Ed, 2015) at p 619. 
201 For instance, is good faith a threshold requirement or merely a factor to be taken 
into account in the exercise? 
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to account is not as strict as courts often represent it to be, in light of the 
availability of equitable allowance that considers factors irrelevant to the 
first stage. Moreover, on occasions, the courts have utilised equitable 
allowance as a “backdoor” method of ensuring that the justice of the 
case is met. For example, in O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music 
Ltd,202 the plaintiff, a young and inexperienced singer/songwriter, was 
enticed by the third defendant to enter into several agreements without 
the benefit of independent advice. These agreements were found to be in 
restraint of trade and unenforceable. The third defendant was also found 
to have been in a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff, and had 
breached his duties. It was ordered that an account of the profits be 
taken of the five defendants of all profits made out of the plaintiff ’s 
copyrights and recordings. However, despite the fact that “moral blame 
does lie upon the defendants”, an allowance was ordered because the 
work carried out by the defendants undoubtedly contributed to the 
plaintiff ’s success.203 Dunn LJ did not think that equity requires a 
narrow approach and regarded it as significant that the plaintiff only 
achieved success after meeting the third defendant. He regarded as 
important that in assessing the advantage gained by the wrongdoer, the 
court will look at the whole situation in the round.204 Fox LJ also 
thought that it went too far to say that the profits must “simply be given 
up”.205 However, this approach is not easily reconcilable with the 
emphasis that many cases have placed on the need for good faith.206 
86 Finally, the argument that the errant fiduciary should bear the 
burden of proof in respect of matters that lie within his or her 
knowledge and control is not particularly persuasive when we turn to 
consider the framework for equitable compensation laid down by the 
High Court in Then Khek Koon (2013). It does not appear that the court 
is concerned that a principal claiming equitable compensation will find 
difficulty in proving motives on the part of the fiduciary. In any event, 
the defendant bears the “evidential” burden of proof. 
V. Conclusion 
87 In the final analysis, there is a certain conceptual symmetry 
between the two remedies of compensation and account of profits. 
A number of relevant factors that go towards ascertaining the extent of 
liability are common. For example, the culpability of the fiduciary has 
                                                          
202 [1985] QB 428. 
203 O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd [1985] QB 428 at 458. 
204 O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd [1985] QB 428 at 458. 
205 O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd [1985] QB 428 at 466. 
206 Cf Warman International Ltd v Dwyer (1994–1995) 182 CLR 544; (1995) 
128 ALR 201. See n 165 above. 
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featured prominently in equitable compensation. Although it has not 
featured quite as explicitly in the account of profits, it finds expression 
through the courts’ decision whether or not to award equitable 
allowance: the more culpable the fiduciary was, the less likely he would 
receive a liberal allowance. The deterrent effect of the remedy is another 
related and common factor. In both equitable compensation and 
account of profits, the courts have consistently emphasised the need for 
strong deterrence against breaches of fiduciary duties. This, however, 
finds expression differently in each of these remedies. 
88 This article has tried to show the importance of recognising 
these underlying common factors. So long as there is a continuum of 
fiduciary relationships, it will be important for the courts to adjust the 
remedies granted to reflect the culpability of the fiduciary. Just as equity 
must deter, it too must not over-punish. Rather than mask their 
consideration of specific factors in such adjustment under the vague 
notion of “strictness”, the courts should explicitly acknowledge the 
precise factors that they have considered. 
89 The Singapore courts may wish explicitly and more fully to 
consider the underlying common factors when revisiting the principles 
for equitable compensation and account of profits in the future. It is 
through such a critical analysis that the remedial legal maze can be 
safely navigated. Importantly, this is not merely an academic exercise 
because these remedies may be sought as alternative remedies. The 
principal is entitled to elect between them, and the choice is often 
determined by the quantum. Clarity in principles is thus necessary for 
the plaintiff to make the most advantageous choice. 
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